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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Pla.intiff and Respondent,
Case
No. 9850

-YS.-

ROLAND DEAN :McQUEEN,
DefendanJ and Appella.nt.

BRIEF OF RESPO·NDENT
NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Roland Dean McQueen, was convicted
upon a jury trial of the crime of robbery in violation of
76-51-1, U.C.A. 1953, and appeals from the judgment of
conviction.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried jointly with George A. Dewitt in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, for
the crime of robbery. After jury trial and a verdict of
guilty being returned, the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow,
Judge, committed the defendant to the Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits the appellant's conviction
should be affirmed.
STATEl\iENT OF FACTS

~ ~ '-'0~~~,~6J; ~1~tered

the rear o the'!:::··.
proximately 3:00 a.m. 111 the morning (R. 49-52)
1~: • 0 ~ • --~
man had a handkerchief over his nose and wore black
kid gloves (R. 52). The other also had a handkerchief
over his nose, but wore gloves with a cuff (R. 56, 74).
Both were apparently wearing levis (R. 74-75). One of
the men wore a pair of light moccasins (R. 76). One man
·was taller, with a small face and carried a rifle (R. 69).
The other, smaller man, was lighter and apparently unarmed (R. 69). As they entered, !{ate Zimmerman, an
employee of the Great Basin Food Service, called for
help (R. 68). The smaller man took a butcher knife off
the table (R. 67, 52). One of the men told ~Irs. Zimmerman to "hold it." (R. 52, 68) Thereafter, the only other
employees working at the time, Duane l{eetch, ::\Iarjorie
Pool and Pat Trujillo, entered the room (R. 50-54). The
men asked where the money was kept, the short man
started through the building, and then the robbers locked
the four employees in a food locker (R. 52, 54, 78). Thereafter, approximately fifteen minutes later, they ·were removed from the food locker and locker in a "'ire cage
·where they remained until they were released by a delivery man (R. 55).
Pat Trujillo, one of the employees, had two dollars
in her purse prior to the robbery. She left her purse
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unattended and upon being released discovered a clock
near her purse had been knocked over and that the two
dollars that had been in her purse was gone (R. 86).
Although all the employees were scared, they identified the appellant and George A. De Witt as the robbers
(R. 68-70), and the gloves (Exhibit 4) of appellant were
identified as the ones worn by one robber (R. 102). The
moccasins were worn by DeWitt (R.104), who was apparently the other robber.
Officer Sexton of the South Salt Lake Police, took
a statement from the appellant wherein he admitted the
robbery, and that he took the two dollars from Pat Trujillo's purse (Exhibit 2).
The appellant at trial was defended by Kenneth
Rigtrup, a duly licensed attorney, and his companion,
DeWitt, ·was defended by Robert McRae, also a licensed
attorney (R. 39). Originally, Mr. McRae was appointed
to defend both accused, and did handle both accuseds'
cases through arraignment up to just before trial (Supp.
R. 2). Approximately two days before trial, the appellant "fired" l\Ir. ~Ir Rae, apparently because he could not
obtain a continuance (Supp. R. 2). The court then appointed l\Ir. Rigtrup, who conferred with Mr. McRae and
the appellant. l\Ir. McRae noted for the record (Supp.
R. 7):
"We discussed this matter from seven until eight
thirty last night as well as on the telephone yesterday afternoon. I advised Mr. Rigtrup every-
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thing that I felt I knew about the trial and to the
best of my ability I did. ~ow, as to what his abilities in view of the short notice to defend this matter, I leave to the discretion of the Court. So far
as my client is concerned who is still incarcerated
in the County Jail, I would resist any joint motion for a continuance. If the Court desires to extend :Mr. Rigtrup and his client the concession of
a separate trial and continuance, that's the discretion of the Court.''
The appellant stated in his own language why he
wanted a continuance. It had nothing to do ·with the merits of his guilt or innocence, but rather was merely to
delay with hope of impressing the Board of Pardons
(Supp. R. 3). Appellant stated:
"vVell, what we talked about was to get out on
bond and get it postponed for a year, year and a
half so I could prove to the Court and Board of
Pardons & Parole if I am found guilty of it that
I can get a job and keep my nose clean and keep
out of trouble and realize I have a responsibility
no·w. * * * ''
During the course of the trial ~Ir. Rigtrup actiYely
participated, and as to the identity of the appellant, made
a careful cross-examination ( R. 61-63).
Finally, although appellant attempts to incorporate
a record of another case into the instant appeal (State Y.
Louden, No. 9851), no part of that record was certified
on appeal, heard by the trial court, nor does it even involve the same rrime.
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ARGUl\1ENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT COl\f~IIT ERROR IN
REFUSING TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION ON
CORROBORATION OF THE APPELLANT'S
CONFESSION.
In appellant's first point just exactly what his contention is is obscured because of a misstatement. He
indicates that the trial court gave an instruction on corroboration of a confession to which appellant excepted
(App. Brief p. 8). This is erroneous, and what he is
apparently attempting to say is that appellant requested
the court to give the instruction set out in his brief,
which was refused and to such refusal an exception was
taken (Supp. R. 3, 4).
If this is appellant's point, it is submitted that the
trial court committed no error in rejecting the proffered
instruction. It is submitted (1) that the proffered instruction was not a correct statement of the law, (2) that no
instruction was necessary, and (3) that no prejudice
could conceivably have resulted.

First, it is a generally recognized principle that the
court need not give an instruction in the language of the
request, nor is the court obligated to give an instruction
which is erroneous. State v. Chadwick, 7 Utah 134, 25
Pac. 737 (1891); State v. Campbell, 116 Utah 74, 208 P.
~d 530 (1949). In the instant case, the requested instruction on corroboration of an accused's confession was not
a proper statement of the la,v. The proffered instruction
5
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would have required the jury to find ''additional corroborative evidence tending to prove that one or both of the
defendants committed the crime of robbery." This is
more than is necessary to corroborate a confession. Normally, all that is required is sufficient evidence to show,
independent of the confession, a corpus delicti. State v.
Weldon, 6 U. 2d 372, 314 P. 2d 353 (1957). It need not
show that the particular defendant or defendants committed the crime. Thus, in 45 ALR 2d 1336, it is noted:
"The courts agree that as a general proposition,
evidence in corroboration of a confession or admission need not connect the defendant with the
crime charged and that such connection can be
shown by his confession or admission without corroboration on that point. * * *"
This court in State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P.
2d 1010 (1938) noted the same rule, where it was said:
''Proof that a crime has been committed by some
one is certainly corroborative of a confession by a
defendant that he committed the crime, for it establishes the existence of a fact included in the
crime confessed and essential to his guilt. * * *"
(Emphasis supplied)
In Williams v. Com1nonu·ealtlz, 306 Ky. 225, 206
S.W. 2d 922 (1947), the accused raised the same contention, and the I{entucky Court of Appeals rejected the
argument that such an instruction was proper. It noted
that corroboration need only show a crime, but need not
connect the defendants to it. The court stated:
"It has been repeatedly held that an instruction
under Section 240 is not proper or required where
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the corpus delecti has been sufficiently established
by other evidence than the defendant's confession,
and that it is not necessary in. order to sustain. a
conviction. that there be evidence tending to con. .
* * * . " ( E mn.ect t 71e accuse d WI.th I. t s commission
phasis supplied)
In 1llan11ing v. United States, 215 F. 2d 945 (lOth
Cir. 1954), the court noted:
''And by the great weight of authority evidence
of his identity as the criminal and his connection
with the crime is not part of the' corpus delicti.' "
The court correctly noted that to hold to the contrary would place the burden on the prosecution of proving all the elements of the crime by independent evidence, and thus, it is arguable, that such an instruction
would mislead the jury. As a consequence, there was
no er~or in not giving the requested instruction. Sheffield Y. State, 188 Ga. 1, 2 S.E. 2d 657 (1939).
Although appellant merely claims, somewhat ambiguously, that it was error to fail to give the requested instruction, it is submitted that no instruction on the subject was in fact necessary. In State v. Weldon, 6 U. 2d
372, 314 P. 2d 353 (1957), this court noted the purpose of
the corpus delicti or corroboration rule:

'' * * * The purpose of the rule was to safeguard
against convicting the innocent on the strength of
false confessions. It appears that there were several actual cases where persons innocent of the
crime were convicted of murder and executed and
the supposed victims later appeared alive.''
7
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In State v. Ferry, 2 U. 2d 373, 275 P. 2d 173 (1954),
this court stated the essence of the corroboration requirement on laying a corpus delicti sufficient to support
a conviction with a confession:
''An accused cannot be convicted on his confession
alone. We believe and hold that in addition there
must be independent, clear and convincing evidence of the corpus delicti, although we and the authorities generally do not require it to be convincing beyond a reasonable doubt.''
Another statement of the general rule is noted in
Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 337:
"In order to have sufficient corroboration for a
confession, the on.ly requirement is that there be
other facts and circumstances in evidence
strengthening and confirming fact that crime has
been committed with which accused identifies himself by his confession." (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case the evidence clearly shows two
men entered the Great Basin Food Service, one carrying
a rifle, both masked. They asked where the money was
kept, locked the employees in a locker, searched the premises, removed two dollars from employee Pat Trujillo's
purse, and finally reimprisoned the employees in a cage of
the premises and fled. No part of the corpus delecti was
uncertain as to the fact of a crime having been committed.
It was dear that robbery had been committed. The appellant offered no contradictory testimony, nor was any
objection as to the sufficiency of the corpus delicti eYer
raised in the trial court, except by way of offering an
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instruction, the obvious purpose of which was to mislead
the jury into thinking the confession was not sufficient as
to identity. It is submitted that under these circumstances there was no reason to give an instruction on
corroboration for the confession. The general rule is
noted is 23A C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 1231:
"The court should properly instruct as to the law
governing, or requiring, corroboration of an extrajudicial confession or admission, but a failure to
do so is not error where the confession is amply
corroborated. Where a confession need be corroborated only as to the corpus delicti to support a
conviction, and the corpus delicti has been clearly
proved, it is not necessary to instruct that a11
extra-judicial confession or admission will not justify a conviction unless accompanied by proof of
the corpus delicti; but, where it is doubtful whether a crime has been committed at all, the jury
should be so instructed. * * * ''
See also 53 Am. J ur ., Trial, Sec. 737 :
* * * But, it has been held, it is unnecessary to
instruct as to the rule requiring corroboration of
a confession where the evidence, apart from the
confession, fully establishes the corpus delicti.''

In D1tnn v. Commonwealth, 350 S.W. 2d 709 (Ky.
1961), the appellant was charged with burglary, and
raised on oppeal the failure of the trial court to instruct
upon corroboration of his confession to support the corpus delicti. The court rejected the contention, noting:
"This court has consistently held that where the
corpus delici ti has been established by evidence
other than the alleged confession of the defendant,
9
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which was done in this case, it is unnecessary to instruct under the foregoing Code section.''
Numerous cases have held that where the corpus delicti is adequately proved, that it is not error to refuse to
give an instruction to the jury. People v. T'rat·is, 129
C. A. 2d 29, 276 P. 2d 173 (1954); People v. Wilde, 82
C. A. 2d 879, 187 P. 2d 825 (1954); Wood v. State, 142
Tex. Cr. 282, 152 S.W. 2d 35. Recently, the Supreme
Court of Hawaii, State v. Hale, 367 P. 2d 81 (Haw. 1961),
discussed at length the necessity for an instruction on
corroborating an accused's confession. In affirming the
conviction, the court noted the instance when an instruction should be given:
"Upon consideration of the rule established in
Yoshida, we have concluded that when, by reason
of incompleteness of the independent evidence,
conflicts in the testimony, impeachment of witnesses ,or other similar reasons, the confession is
or may be a crucial part of the proof of the corpus
delicti, it is within the province of the jury to determine '''hether the independent proof shows the
confession to be trustworthy. * * * \Ye also are of
the view that an instruction on corroboration is
not required in every case. * * * ''
Since in the instant case the evidence establishing
the corpus delicti is uncontradicted and complete, no basis
for an instruction existed, and the court quite properly
did not instruct on the rna tter.
Finally, courts have held that even where an instruction may be proper, if there is substantial additional evidence making out the corpus delicti, no prejudice from
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the failure to give an instruction can be claimed. Peop.Ze
v. CltaJI Chaun, 41 C.A. 2d 586, 107 P. 2d 455.

POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE OF CORPUS DELICTI IS
SUFFICIENT TO CORROBORATE THE APPELLANT'S CONFESSION.
The appellant contends the evidence of corpus delicti
was insufficient to corroborate his confession to the crime.
Reliance for such a view is placed on State v. Wells, 35
Utah 400, 100 Pac. 681 (1909). Reliance upon this case is
misplaced to the degree it is contended that the corpus
delicti must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt since in
State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P. 2d 1010 (1938), the
\Vells rule was abandoned. Thus, in State v. Ferry, 2 U.
2d 371, 275 P. 2d 173 (1954), the court noted:
In State v. Wells, 1909, 35 Utah 400, 100 P. 681,
136 Am. St. Rep. 1059, 19 Ann. Cas. 631, we held
the independent evidence must prove the corpus
delicti beyond a reasonable doubt; in State v.
Johnson, 1938, 95 Utah 572, 83 P. 2d 1010, we
softened that rule by saying such proof need not
be conclusive; we ennunciate the rule in our present decision, to clarify the matter, feeling that
such rule, already announced in Arizona in burrows v. State, 8 Ariz. 99, 297 P. 1029, is the soundest of those heretofore enunciated by the authorities. See also, State v. Crank, 1943, 105 Utah 332,
142 P. 2d 178, 170 A.L.R. 542."
The rule now in effect in this state is that the corroboration for corpus delicti need only be ''independent,
11
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clear and convincing.'' State Y. Ferry, supra; State '"·
Weldon, 6 U. 2d 372, 314 P. 2d 353 (1957). Applying this
standard to the instant case, it is clear that the evidence
is amply sufficient to make out a corpus delicti. Appellant
argues that the evidence is not sufficient to show a taking
of personal property. Clearly there is no merit to this
assertion, since Pat Trujillo testified that she bought
some shrimp prior to the robbery, she had $2.00 in her
purse at the time of the robbery, that a clock near her
purse was knocked over and the money gone. Additionally, the evidence is overwhelming that the appellant
searched the building in an effort to find money to steaL
Consequently, no merit at all to appellant's position exists
on this point.
POINT III.
APPELLANT l\1:AY NOT CO~IPLAIN OF ANY
ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE SIXCE:
A. NO EVIDENCE OF ANY SUCH ACTIVITY APPEARS OF RECORD.
B. NO ISSUE WAS RAISED BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT AN"D APPELLA~T HAS,
THEREFORE, \Y AIVED THE ISSrE.
C. NO EVIDENCE PROCURED BY AXY ILLEGAL SEARCH \YAR BEFORE THE
JURY.
A. Appellant has attempted to incorporate by reference the record in the case of State Y. Louden, No. 9851,
and therrhr raise an i~sne of search and seizure. No part
of the evidence in the Louden record was eYer placed
before the trial court, nor certified as part of the record
12
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on appeal. Consequently, no part of that record is considerable by this court in deciding the instant case, and
the issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
Rule 77-39-12, U.R.Cr.P. as amending 77-39-12, U.C.A.
1953; People Y. Callaghan, 4 Utah 49, 6 Pac. 49; State v.
Augle, 61 Utah 432, 215 Pac. 531; State v. Kinder, 381 P.
2d 82 (Utah 1963).
B. ~ o issue of any illegal search and seizure was
ever raised in the trial court, during trial or by pre-trial
motion. Although this court has not passed on the mater
nor promulgated a rule of procedure on the appropriate
way to proceed, 1 courts from other jurisdictions have generally held that an objection must be made either before
trial or during trial in order to preserve the question of
an illegal search for appellate review. 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 1672d comments:
''If no objection is made in the trial court to the
reception of evidence on the gound that it was
wrongfully obtained, as, by illegal search and seizure, or in the course of a claimed illegal arrest, or
by wire tapping or other violation of state or federal communication acts, the generally recognized
rule is that the reviewing court will not consider
such contention when it is raised for the first time
on appeal * * *.''
In Gendron v. United States, 295 F. 2d 897 (8th Cir.
1961), the court ruled :
''On the search and seizure issue, defendant did
not at any time make a motion to suppress the
1

See generally Rule 41 (e) F.R.Cr.P.; Rule 41 (e) Colo. R. Cr. Procedure,
34 Rocky Mountain L. Rev. 86 (1962).
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stolen bonds as evidence on the ground that they
were unlawfully seized, in the manner required by
Rule 41(3), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Defendant likewise made no objection to the Government's offer of such bonds in evidence. In
fact, when the Government offered said bonds in
evidence, defendant's counsel stated, 'No objection.' Accordingly, there is no ruling of the trial
court upon the admission of the bonds in evidence
or upon the search an dseizure issue here for us to
review. Billeci v. United States, 9 Cir., 290 F. 2d
628, 629.''
When the United States Supreme Court again recognized the exclusionary rule in federal cases in Tr eeks v.
United States, 232 U. S. 383, they ruled that the illegality
of the evidence would have to be passed upon by pretrial motion. Later the condition \Vas modified where
the defendant had no prior knowledge of the illegality of
the search before trial, Gould v. United States, 233 U. S.
298, and further that a motion at trial would be proper
if there ·was no dispute as to the facts, Agnello v. eniterl
States, 269 U. S. 20; however, some objection would have
to be made before conclusion of the case. Since no objection was made in the instant case, no basis for appellate review is available and the appellant must be deemed
to have waived any objection.
C. 2 E\'en if it were admitted that there was an illegal
search and seizure, appellant fails to show how he was
injured by it. The comparison of the Louden record with
the instant record does not reveal that any of the evidence
2

The State stLbmits there was no illegal search and seizure in State v. Louden. See Respondent's Brief, State v. Louden, No. 9851.
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obtained by any search was used in this case or that it
led to any evidence used in this case. Nor does appellant
in his brief show such a connection. Unless the search
culminated in producing evidence used against the accused, no harm can be claimed. Nardone v. United States,
308 u. s. 38, 341.
There is, therefore, no basis procedurally or substantively to the appellant's claim.

POINT IV.
APPELLANT HAS NO BASIS TO SEEK REVERSAL BECAUSE OF ANY ILLEGAL ARREST SINCE:
A. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ARREST WERE NOT BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT NOR THE ISSUE RAISED
BELOW.
B. SUCH CLAIM WOULD AFFORD NO
BASIS FOR REVERSAL OF APPELANT'S CONVICTION.
A. The appellant contends that the conviction should
be reversed because appellant's arrest was illegal. Appellant apparently bases this on the Louden record which
is not properly before the court, nor was the substantive
issue raised in the trial court. Consequently, it is not
now properly before this court on appeal. Peo1Jle v.
Northrup, 21 Cal. Rptr. 448, 203 ACA 498 (1962).
B. Even were the issue before the court, it would
afford appellant no relief. An illegal arrest prior to trial
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is no basis to attack the court's decision convicting him
of a crime. In lV ashington, v. Renouf, 5 U. 2d 185, 299
P. 2d 620 (1956), the appellants sought release prior to
trial based upon their illegal arrest and transportation
to Utah for trial. The court denied relief, noting that although the original arrest may be illegal, if the prisoner
is held by proper legal process, thereafter he may not
complain. Thus, the court noted:
''The U. S. Supreme Court has held in numerous
instances that no U. S. Constitutional provisions
are violated by illegal, improper, or unlawful
means of obtaining jurisdiction over the person
of the accused where he is held under proper
process. * * * ''
If the appellant had in fact been illegally held, he
rna~· have obtained relief at that time, but now having
been convicted, he may not complain since he is properly
held.
Appellant does not contend that any evidence was
illegally taken from him or that he sustained any prejudice by his detention. Nor does appellant cite 77-12-14,
U.C.A. 1953, requiring that a person arrested be taken
forthwith before a magistrate. Even if this were not
done in this case, it could not vitiate the conviction in
the absenc>e of a showing that it in some way depriYed him
of a fair trial. PeOJJle Y. Guarino, 132 P. 2d 59 (1953);
People v. Higldo1cc'r, 11 Cal. Hptr. 198, 189 C.A. 2d 309
(1961); Pcoplr v. Jackson; 6 Cal. Rptr. 884, 183 C.A. 2d
562 (1960); PeoJJle v. Boyd, 21 Cal. Hptr. 444, 203 ACA
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363 (1962). In People v. lmblPr, 21 Cal. Rptr. 568, 371
P. :2d 304 (1962), the California Supreme Court noted:
''Defendant contends that his conviction must be
reversed because he was taken into custody on
January 14, 1961, but was not informed of the
charges against him until the following February
14. Defendant was legally in custody during this
time because he had pleaded guilty to the robbery
in Pomona. Although he should have been taken
before the magistrate on the murder charge within the time limit prescribed in Penal Code section
825, the failure to do so is not a ground for reversing the conviction. * * * ''
See also State v. Gardner, 119 Utah 579, 230 P. 2d 559
(1951), ·where this court ruled that even though the accused had not been taken before a magistrate as required
hy 105-12-14, U.C.A. 1943 (77-12-14, U.C.A. 1953), it
would not compel exclusion of his confession obtained
during this time.
Consequently, the point raised is manifestly without
merit.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN REFUSING APPELLANT A
CONTINUANCE.
The appellant contends that this court should reverse
his conviction on the grounds that his counsel at trial was
not given adequate time for preparation. The facts on
this point show that a warrant for arrest of the appellant
was issued on August 17, 1962, based upon a complaint
dated July 20, 1962 (R. 3, 6). A preliminary hearing on
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the complaint was held on August 17, 1962, and the appellant was present and represented by Robert lYicRae
(R. 2). An information was duly filed against appellant
by the District Attorney on August 29, 1962 (R. 7). l'vlr.
McRae coontinued to represent the appellant, and on
September 4, 1962, the appellant was arraigned and plead
not guilty. The appellant was out on bond of $2500.00
from the time of arraignment (Supp. R. 2). On October
10, 1962, appellant's attorney, ~ir. :McRae, was advised
that the trial would be on November 8, 1962. He attempted to advise the appellant, who had left Utah and gone
to Nebraska, of the impending trial date. On about K ovember 6, 1962, the appellant entered his attorney's office
and said he wanted a continuance (Supp. R. 2). Because
counsel indicated he did not believe he could get a continuance, the appellant "fired" ::Mr. ::McRae and said he
would get counsel (Supp. R. 2, 3). ~ir. ~icRae thereafter notified the court and Kenneth Rigtrup was immediately appointed for appellant. ~fr. Rigtrup discussed
the case with Mr. McRae for about 1lf2 hours, informed
him of the anticipated proof, and the possible defenses .
.Jir. Rigtrup had some consultation ·with his client also
( Supp. R. 6-8). On November 8, 1962, a motion for continuance was made by appellant. His reasons, as distinct
from counsel's, for wanting the continuance, were expressed as follows (Supp. R. 3):
"\Vell, what we talked about was to get out on
bond and get it postponed for a year, year and a
half so I could prove to the Court and Board of
Pardons & Parole if I am found guilty of it that I
can get a job and keep my nose clean and keep out
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of trouble and realize I have a responsibility
now. * * *''
The court's response was as follows (Supp. R. 5):
"In any event, it's been almost four months since
the alleged commission of this offense and that's
plenty long enough. This matter should be heard
right away. Those matters you discussed just now
in court, Mr. McQueen, as far as you making
good and getting a job, those are matters to discuss with the probation department at such time as
that is available to you. We can't have a continuance on the merits in connection with this trial
over long periods to prove the good intentions of
the defendants.''
The court denied the motion for continuance. Appellant went to trial represented by nir. Rigtrup, along with
his co-defendant, George DeWitt, who was represented
by ~Ir. JicRae. Both Mr. Rigtrup and Mr. McRae crossexamined witnesses and made objections, apparently
without specific reference to their individual clients.
Upon conclusion of the very conclusive case for the State,
the defense for both men rested (R. 110) without putting
on additional evidence. Based on the above, it is submitted that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
denying a continuance.
In State v. Mathis, 7 U. 2d 100, 319 P. 2d 134 (1957),
this court noted :
''The request for continuance is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court and unless
there is plain abuse its ruling will not be disturbed. * * * ' '
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This court has repeatedly followed the rule that the trial
judge will only be held to have erred if in exercising hi;-;
discretion he went beyond the bounds of reason and tlm~
denied the accused an opportunity for a fair trial. lc:tate
v. Fairclough, 86 Utah 326, 44 P. 2d 692 (1935); State '"·
Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P. 2d 750 (1936); State Y. Hartman, 101 Utah 298, 119 P. 2d 112 (1941); State v. Tri1liams, 49 Utah 320, 163 Pac. 1104 (1917); State v. Cano,
64 Utah 87, 228 Pac. 563 (1924); State v. Anselmo, 46
Utah 137,148 Pac.1071 (1915). This is the rule of general application in this country, and the courts have ruled
that this is true even where the claim of insufficient time
for preparation is made. Prescott Y. State, 56 Okl. Cr.
259, 37 P. 2d 830 (1934); State v. Badgley, 140 l{an. 349,
37 P. 2d 16 (1934).
In State v. Penderrille, 2 U. 2d 281, 272 P. 2d 195,
(1954), this court cautioned as to the right of a defendant to use a constitutional right, not as directly raised
here, to delay or obstruct trial. The court noted:

'' * * * An accused may not, however, having once
elected to proceed with the aid of counsel for purposes of delay or to obstruct the proceeding
against him advance successfully· an insincere
claim of his right to defend in person. * * * ''
By the same token, an accused who is bent on contin-:uance for no motive reasonably connected with his trial
should not be allowed to ''fire'' counsel and claim lack of
preparation, thereby bringing into fruition a continuance
that would otherwise be ,,·ithout merit. In People v.
O'Nf'ill, 179 P. 2d 10 (Cal. .App. 1947), the defendant
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claimed he was denied the right of counsel. The court
noted that just before trial the accused fired the public
defender, and elected to proceed without counsel. The
court, in rejecting the constitutional claim, stated, ho\\Te\·er:
'' * * * Appellant did not ask for a continuance for
the purpose of obtaining counsel and if he had
done so the trial court would not have erred in
the circumstances existing here in refusing to
grant the request. * * *"
In People v. Meades, 219 P. 2d 1 (Cal. 1950), the California Supreme Court rejected a contention that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying a continuance in
a murder case. The court in doing so noted that although
trial counsel had just recently been retained, he had the
benefit of assistance of counsel who had been connected
with the case for sometime earlier. In the instant case,
jfr. :JicRae was present and in effect assisted, and thus
"newly retained" counsel had the benefit of counsel \Yho
had ample time to familiarize himself with the case.
In State v. Gibson, 229 N.C. 497, 50 S.E. 2d 520
(1948), the accused was convicted of rape after a plea of
not guilty. He was arrested September 13, 1948, arraigned
the same day and counsel appointed. Counsel consulted
with his client and trial was set for the afternoon of the
next day. On appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed, noting :
''While the circumstances lend some color to the
argument that trial was had in the court below
with regrettable dispatch, we must perform our
function as an appellate court with due regard for
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the fundamental and indispensable rule that the
record must not only show error, but also that the
appellant '''as prejudiced thereby. * * * [Note a
similar requirement 77-42-1, U.C.A. 1953] Ordinarily a motion for a continuance on the ground of
a want of time for counsel for accused to prepare
for trial is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial judge, and his ruling thereon is not subject to review on appeal in the absence of circumstances showing that he has grossly abused his discretionary power. Relevant deisions compel the
conclusion that an abuse of discretion has not been
made manifest in the case at bar. * * * ''
In Roth Y. State, 70 Ga. App. 93, 27 S.E. 2d 473, the
court ruled 20 minutes to be adequate time for preparation in a bigamy case not presenting any unusual
or complex issues. In the instant case, no complexity is
shown, and although ·appellant attempts to make some
claim to possible illegal search and seizure, the lack of
eYidence procured in this case as a result of such a
search, nor any attempt by co-counsel to raise the issue,
obviously shows its lack of merit.
Numerous cases similar to this case where an abuse
of discretion has not been found can be cited; among a
few are: State Y. Cano, 64 Utah 87, 228 Pac. 563 {1924);
Cannady Y. State, 190 Ga. 227, 9 S.E. 2d 241: State Y.
If endricks, 66 Ariz. 235, 186 P. 2d 943; People Y. ~~lcNabb,
3 Cal. 2d 441, 45 P. 2d 334; People Y. Sha.zr, 46 Cal. 2d
768, 117 P. 2d 34; State Y. Gallo, 128 N. J. Law 172, 24
A. 2d 557; Thompson v. State, 51 Ga. App. 5, 179 S.E. 200;
State v. TVilson, 181 La. 61, 158 So. 621; 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 496, p. 155. In the instant case the accused
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fired counsel, had no substantial reason for a continuance, and was adequately defended, and under these circumstances no abuse eof discretion can be claimed. To
allow the accused to so claim would give court assistance
to self-induced error.

CONCLUSION
Appellants' contentions on appeal, though multiple,
are unusually unmeritorious, and this court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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